When are California Employers on Notice of a Disability for the Purposes of Liability under the FEHA?

A recent decision of the California Court of Appeal clarified that an employer’s knowledge of an employee’s undisclosed disability can only be inferred from the employee’s conduct when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts.

Under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (“FEHA”), an employer can be held liable for (1) discriminating against a person because of a “physical” or “mental disability;” (2) failing to make reasonable accommodation for a “known physical or mental disability,” and (3) failing to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process to determine effective reasonable accommodations.

However, to be held liable under any of these theories an employer must know about the employee’s disability. Or, put another way, an employer cannot discriminate (or fail to engage in an interactive process to reach such an accommodation) against an employee on the basis of a disability if it does not know about that disability (Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1247; Gov. Code § 12940, subds. (m)(1) & (n) [requiring a “known” disability].)

On the other hand, under California law sometimes an employer can be held liable for disability-based claims under the FEHA even when the employee has not disclosed his disability to his employer. Older cases answered that question relatively conservatively, holding that, for purposes of a FEHA claim for discrimination, an employer’s knowledge of a disability will be inferred “only . . . when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts.” (Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 237.) (emphasis added)

Later cases like Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 601 seemed to apply a looser standard:

An employer knows an employee has a disability when the employee tells the employer about his condition, or when the employer otherwise becomes aware of the condition, such as through a third party or by observation. The employer need only know the underlying facts, not the legal significance of those facts. (internal quotation marks omitted)

But what about cases in which neither the employee or a third party discloses the condition to the employer? A May 2026 decision of the California Court of Appeal, Second District (Second DCA) addressed this exact question and applied the more strict knowledge test described in Brundage.

In Husband v. Target Corporation, case no. B342334, Mr. Husband had undisclosed bipolar disorder. He was terminated after several incidents where he made irrational comments in the workplace and became “aggressive.” These incidents led to Mr. Husband’s supervisor becoming concerned for his mental state and sending an email up the chain of command noting his concerns. (In fact, the second incident was bad enough that Mr. Husband was sent home with a recommendation that he get examined by a “doctor/psych professional.”)

The trial court dismissed Mr. Husband’s claims on summary judgment. The Second DCA affirmed.

The Second DCA first addressed Mr. Husband’s claim for disability discrimination. The court reasoned that an employer can only discriminate because of a disability if it knows about the disability. The court then held that:

[Where] neither the employee nor a third party has disclosed the employee’s mental disability, “knowledge” of that disability “will only be imputed to the employer” through its observation of the “underlying facts” “when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts.”

Turning to Mr. Husband’s claim for failure to accommodate, the Second DCA concluded that the duty to engage in an interactive process and to accommodate also only arise when an employer is aware of an employee’s disability. The court acknowledged that notice from an employee is not the only way to trigger the duties to reasonably accommodate or to engage in the interactive process; rather, those duties can also be triggered if the employer learns of the employee’s disability from a third party or its own observation.

But when it comes to knowledge by observation:

[A]n employer will be charged with knowledge of a disability by observation only if the observed “symptoms are . . . so obviously manifestations of an underlying disability” that the existence of a disability “always follow[s]” from the observed symptoms. (emphasis added)

Turning to the facts of the case, the Second DCA found that the record showed that Mr. Husband had engaged in emotional and irrational behavior in the workplace. However, bipolar disorder was not the only reasonable interpretation of Mr. Husband’s behavior. Furthermore, the non-expert opinions of Mr. Husband’s supervisors did not change that fact.

In other words, generally erratic behavior in the workplace that could be the result of mental illness, but could also be the result of other factors, does not convey knowledge sufficient for the FEHA’s protections to kick in. That is the case even if some of the individuals who witnessed the behavior suspected that it was the result of mental illness.

The attorneys at Hunter Pyle Law, PC, have handled numerous disability discrimination cases. If you have question about your situation at work, please feel free to contact us and to make use of our free and confidential intake process.